Abstract. The cipher family SPEED (and an associated hashing mode) was recently proposed in Financial Cryptography '97. In cryptanalyzing the cipher we found several troubling potential weaknesses. Next, we were able to e ciently break the SPEED hashing mode using di erential related-key techniques. Finally, we examined di erential attacks against the 48-round version of SPEED. These results raise some significant questions about the security of the SPEED design.
Introduction
In Financial Cryptography '97, Zheng proposed a new family of block ciphers, called SPEED 1] . One speci es a particular SPEED cipher by choosing parameters such as the block size and number of rounds; the variations are otherwise alike in their key schedule and round structure. Under the hood, SPEED is built out of an unbalanced Feistel network. Zheng also proposed a hash function based on running a SPEED block cipher in a slightly modi ed Davies-Meyer mode.
One of the main contributions of the SPEED design is its prominent use of carefully chosen Boolean functions which can be shown to have very good non-linearity, as well as other desirable theoretical properties. One might therefore hope that SPEED rests on a solid theoretical foundation in cryptographic Boolean function theory. Nonetheless, we have found serious weaknesses in the cipher; many lead to practical attacks on SPEED.
In examining the cipher there appears to be an obvious 1-bit di erential attack which works with probability 2 ?50 against the 48-round version of the cipher. However, our analysis indicates that this attack may in fact fail to work. A future paper will address the strength of SPEED against di erential cryptanalysis in greater detail.
Despite our di culties with the di erential attack, we succeeded in nding collisions for the SPEED hash function. For the 128-bit hash with 32 rounds, we found the following collision (in base-16): This leads to the following values when hashing (in base-16): D0 = 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 D1 = DA2B A119 A4F8 AA70 59ED 6FE4 188B 7969 D2 ? D1 = CAB1 DA86 B6D3 1442 E05C A005 7B26 C432
Conclusions
It is interesting to note that SPEED, though built using very strong component functions, doesn't appear to be terribly secure. The SPEED design apparently relied upon the high quality of the binary functions used, the fact that di erent functions were used at di erent points in the cipher, and the data-dependent rotations to provide resistance to cryptanalysis. Unfortunately, the most e ective attacks aren't made much less powerful by any of these defenses.
Due to these weaknesses, we would recommend against using SPEED for high security applications. It's not clear whether or not someone could design a security cipher using the same sort of boolean function theory. Therefore the utility of these functions in cipher design is still an open avenue of research.
